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This study examines the long-standing IPO performance in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) by using
new factors such as source of shares (new issue or sale of large shareholders), allocation of shares and
dispersion of investors as well as existing factors such as market conditions (hot/cold), underwriters’ re-
putation, and firm characteristics (firm size, E/P, and B/M ratios) in the period of 1990-2000. Our results
differ from the previous studies at least three ways. First, the magnitude of underpricing is significantly
lower, while underperformance is higher than those of in other studies. Our strong evidence supports the
existence of the underpricing by positive initial excess returns (5.94%) and the long-term underperfor-
mance up to three-year holding period (-84.5%) in the ISE. Second, underperformance starts much earli-
er than in other markets i.e. at the end of first month following the IPO because of myopic behavior of
investors seeking short-term returns. Third, the underperformance disappears for IPOs made in a cold
market, and those made through the sale of large shareholders. Allocation of shares in an IPO and firm
size also impact after-market performance of shares.
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Ö Öz ze et t   - -   ‹ ‹M MK KB B’ ’d de e   ‹ ‹l lk k   H Ha al lk ka a   A Ar rz zl la ar r› ›n n   P Pi iy ya as sa a   P Pe er rf fo or rm ma an ns s› ›
Bu çal›ﬂmada, ‹stanbul Menkul K›ymetler Borsas› (‹MKB) nda 1990-2000 y›llar› aras›nda yap›lan ilk hal-
ka arzlar›n uzun dönemli performans›, piyasan›n durumu (hareketli/dura¤an), halka arza arac›l›k eden ku-
rumlar›n ünü ve hisseleri halka arz edilen ﬂirketlerin özellikleri (ﬂirket büyüklü¤ü, F/K ve PD/DD oranlar›)
yan›nda, hisse ihrac›n›n kayna¤› (yeni hisse ihrac› veya büyük ortaklar›n sat›ﬂ›), ihraç edilen hisse senetleri-
nin yat›r›mc›lar aras›ndaki da¤›l›m› ve yat›r›mc›lar›n farkl›l›¤› gibi yeni faktörler kullan›larak analiz edilmiﬂtir.
Çal›ﬂman›n sonuçlar›, ayn konuda daha önce yap›lm›ﬂ çal›ﬂmalarda ortaya konulan bulgulardan üç yönden
farkl›l›k göstermektedir. ‹lk olarak, di¤er çal›ﬂmalarla karﬂ›laﬂt›r›ld›¤›nda, ilk halka arzdaki düﬂük fiyatlama-
n›n (underpricing) boyutu daha küçük olmakla birlikte, halka arz edilen hisse senetlerinin uzun dönemli
getirilerinin düﬂük performans›n›n (underperformance) daha yüksek boyutta olmas› dikkat çekmektedir.
Çal›ﬂmadaki k›sa dönemli pozitif getiriler (% 5.94) düﬂük fiyatlamay›, uzun dönemli negatif getiriler (% -
84.5) ise uzun dönemdeki düﬂük performans› güçlü olarak desteklemektedir. ‹kinci olarak, ‹MKB’de dü-
ﬂük performans, dalgal› piyasada k›sa dönemde yüksek getiri elde etmek isteyen yat›r›mc›lar›n k›sa ufuklu
bak›ﬂ aç›s› nedeniyle di¤er piyasalarla karﬂ›laﬂt›r›ld›¤›nda daha erken bir dönemde (halka arz› izleyen birin-
ci ay›n sonunda) baﬂlamaktad›r. Üçüncü olarak ise, piyasan›n cazip olmad›¤› (dura¤an oldu¤u) y›llarda ve
büyük ortaklar›n sat›ﬂ› ﬂeklinde gerçekleﬂtirilen ilk halka arzlarda uzun vadedeki düﬂük performans›n orta-
dan kalkt›¤› gösterilmektedir. ‹lk halka arzlarda hisse senetlerinin da¤›l›m› ve firma büyüklü¤ü de hisse se-
netlerinin ihraç sonras› performans› üzerinde etkili olmaktad›r.
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1. Introduction
The puzzle of initial public offerings’ (IPOs) pricing both in the short and long-run
has become a riveting example of pervasive market inefficiency. Ritter (1991) and
Loughran and Ritter (1995) document severe underperformance of IPOs during the
past 25 years in US. They show that companies issuing stocks during 1970-1990,
significantly underperform relative to non-issuing firms for five years after the offe-
ring date. Many researchers confirmed that underperformance extends to other co-
untries as well as to seasoned equity offerings. For example, Loughran, Ritter, and
Rydqvist (1994), Kang and Stulz (1996), Cai and Wei (1997), Hamao, Packer, and
Ritter (1998), Levis (1993), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), Affleck-Graves, Hedge,
and Miller (1996), Field (1995), Hanley (1993), Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez
(1993), Loughran (1993) are a few of the studies that show  IPOs on average un-
derperform the market index over a two-to-five year period in the aftermarket in  a
wide range of countries developed as well as developing markets. However, in so-
me countries, the long-run performance is more pronounced. For instance, in Ger-
many, Stehle, Ehrhardt, and Przyborowsky (2000) estimate that IPOs underperform
a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in a thre-
e-year period. Loughran et al. (1994) illustrate that IPO returns do not significantly
differ from market returns in Sweden. Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) report
three-year market adjusted returns of –47.0%, -19.6% and -23.7% for Brazil, Mexi-
co and Chile, respectively, which are the representative examples for emerging mar-
kets like Turkey. At the extreme, Kiymaz (1997, 2000) finds positive post-listing ab-
normal returns for Turkish IPOs in the long-run.
Previous studies also demonstrate that IPOs, on average, are underpriced relati-
ve to the first trading day closing price. Welch (1989) reports an average underpri-
cing of 26% for 1028 IPOs issued during 1977-1982, Ritter’s (1984) analysis shows
an average underpricing of 26.5%, Booth and Chua (1996) find an average under-
pricing of 13.1% for a sample of 2151 IPOs during 1977-1988, and Keloharju
(1993) cites an average underpricing of 8.7% for Finnish IPOs.  Other research indi-
cates a positive relation between the initial day return and aftermarket underperfor-
mance.1 Ritter (1991) finds a negative, but statistically insignificant relation betwe-
en initial IPO returns and three-year aftermarket performance. 
Although extensive amounts of research, mostly on the US markets, variously in-
dicate the existence of short-term outperformance and long-term underperforman-
ce of IPOs, there is no consistent and conclusive evidence of the determinants of
this phenomenon, particularly through the examination on  international data. Ho-
wever, it is important for the policy-makers, portfolio managers, shareholders and
corporate managers. Hence, the purpose of this study is not only to examine the
(1) Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and
Miller (1996), Foerster  and Karolyi (1999)51
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performance of IPOs in the Turkish market by providing additional evidence from a
leading emerging market to understand whether the IPO puzzle is a sample-specific
or world-wide phenomenon, but also to scrutinize the factors that affect the perfor-
mance of IPOs through new factors such as source of shares sold in the IPO (new
issue or sale of large shareholders), ownership of foreign investors, and number of
investors at the IPO representing the divergence of investors’ opinions, as well as
factors used in previous studies such as firm size, earnings-to-price ratio, book-to-
market ratio, underwriters’ reputation, and market conditions (cold vs. hot market). 
There are few studies that examine this issue in emerging markets, which have dif-
ferent risk and return characteristics than developed markets. There are also several un-
derlying differences that inform the IPO process in the Turkish capital market. For
example, intermediary institutions rarely underwrite an issue because of the high- risk
profile in the market due to political and macroeconomic instability during our sample
period. Hence, our paper makes an important difference from other studies. Another
distinguishing difference underlying our research is that all IPOs adopted the fixed-pri-
ce offer method, which is published in the prospectus, before the offer starts. 
This study also aims to shed further light on questions that remained unclear  in
previous studies in the literature such as:  Does the underperformance of IPOs ref-
lect reversal of high initial returns? Is there a systematic relation between long-term
underperformance and first-day returns? Is there a recovery in the underperforman-
ce in a long- term period?  And, finally, what are the determinants of post-issue per-
formance of stocks? These issues are important because they have implications for
a large body of literature dealing with the short-run underpricing phenomenon. To
address these questions, this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 highlights
the recent literature about IPOs performance in the long run, while Section 3 gives
a short description of the IPO procedure in Turkey including data and methodology
used in the study. Section 4 shows the results of the empirical analyses. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
While a large body of research examines different aspects of the post-IPO stock
return performance of new listings, little has been documented regarding the firm-
specific characteristics that are associated with the IPO puzzle. Jain and Kini (1994)
report that occasionally financial performance ratios of firms that go public fall dra-
matically in the three-year period following the IPO. Mikkelson and Shah (1994) indi-
cate that IPOs have poor subsequent returns due to misvaluations of the firm by the
time it goes public. Loughran and Ritter (1995) also find that holding both size and
book-to-market ratio constant, issuing firms have lower subsequent returns than
non-issuers. This evidence remains consistent with a market in which firms capital-
ize on their shares being  overvalued  during an IPO. Brav and Gompers (1997) find
that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal-weight-52 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
ed returns. Value-weighting substantially reduces underperformance. In contrast,
Hamao et al. (1998) find no difference for the performance of venture-backed IPOs.
Short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance suggests that investors
may systematically be too optimistic about the prospects of the firms that are issuing
equity for the first time. Rajan and Servaes (1997) state that security analysts are system-
atically overoptimistic about the earnings potential and long-term growth prospects of
the recent IPOs. Miller (1997) explains IPO underperformance assuming divergence of
investor opinions, if there are no short sales. Morris (1996) also shows that heterogene-
ity of beliefs can support an over-valued IPO right after the issue relative to the long-run
value. Brav and Gompers (1997) mentioned that bouts of investment sentiment are a
possible explanation for their underperformance, since individuals are more likely to be
influenced by fad, misleading or incomplete information spread by rumors during an
IPO. Shiller (1990) argues  the IPO market is subject to fads exploited by intermediary
firms that manage the IPO through underpriced issues. Such fads must eventually fade
leading to long-run low performance.
Recently, Krigman et al. (1999) find an interesting link between the initial trad-
ing volume and the long-term performance: first-day winners continue to be win-
ners over the first year, and first- day losers continue to be losers.  The exception is
extra-hot IPOs, which are seriously underpriced, and  yield the worst future perform-
ance since major informed investors sell shares on the first trading day. Thus, sales
of insiders indicate long-run negative performance. Loughran and Ritter (2000) posit
that underperformance is more severe in high-volume trading periods than in low-
volume periods. 
3. Empirical Research
3.1. Institutional Specifications of the ISE
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was established in 1986, and has shown  rapid
growth since then. As a leading emerging market, the ISE’s progressive infrastructure
and unique dynamism increasingly attracts international interest. On average, interna-
tional institutional investors own 50% of the free float of the shares at the ISE. Total
market capitalization is approximately US$ 100 billion. This is a highly active market,
with an average daily trading value of US$ 753 million and 287 listed stocks as of year-
end 2002. The ISE is an order-driven, multiple-price, continuous auction market with no
market makers or specialists. The trading is realized through a computerized trading
system. The “National-100 Index” (ISE-100), which is the main market indicator of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, is a market capitalization-weighted index that represents at
least 80% of the total market capitalization, traded value, number of shares traded,
and number of trades realized in the market.
A company seeking to go public and then listing in the ISE should, first, make an
agreement with an investment bank (brokerage firm) that will subsequently manage53
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and conduct the IPO process. After shares to be issued are registered by the Capital
Market Board (SEC of Turkey), a legal notice and a prospectus are published specifying
the number of shares to be offered to the public, including the price and the date of
the offer. The intermediary brokerage house managing the IPO prepares the circular
and prospectus. The company chooses between a fixed price offer or tender.2 In a fixed
price offer, the brokerage house managing the IPO fixes the price of the issue long
before the offer is made public and distributes the shares at this fixed price. Once the
price of the issue is determined, it can neither be changed in response to emerging
demand nor can it be withdrawn. While the shares are offered to the public at a fixed
price, the issue might be partially or fully underwritten by an intermediary brokerage
house that manages the IPO. In practice, investment banks or brokerage houses never
or rarely underwrite the issue in Turkey because of the high political risk volatility in the
country. If there is excessive demand for the IPO, the IPO manager must allocate the
shares based on the “fairness” rules stated in the regulations of the Capital Market
Board. In addition to the valuation, preparation of the circular and the prospectus of
the issuer company plus all red-tape documentation and application procedures, the
main function of the IPO manager is to sell and distribute the shares. After the offer is
made to the public and the shares are sold, the issuing company applies to the
Exchange for listing. After a short period of examination by the ISE that begins before
the actual offer is made the new shares start trading at the ISE.
3.2. Data and Methodology
There are 244 firms in the ISE that went public from 1990-2000. The companies that
did not have data for more than 12 months were excluded from our sample. If the
offering firm is delisted or merges with another firm, the holding-period returns of that
firm are truncated on the same day. Only 10 firms, which have one of these conditions,
are deleted from the main IPO file. Thus, we use a sample of 234 companies going pub-
lic and listed on the ISE in this period and their return data of 1990-2003.3 All data are
obtained from the ISE.
We calculate the buy-and-hold returns from the IPO price to the anniversary date of
the offering since there are no allocation problems or concerns regarding excluding the
first trading day price as considered by Loughran and Ritter (1995). For example, in
Turkish IPOs, all investors are capable of buying shares at a fixed IPO price, which is
announced long before the offer date. To measure the long-run performance of IPOs,
we compute an aftermarket return from purchasing the stocks at the IPO price. The
(2) Companies that want to go public, most often prefer the “offer for sale at a fixed-price” method
in Turkey because of the high uncertainty in the political and macroeceonomic environment.
(3) There are just few companies went public between 2001 and 2005 because of the negative mar-
ket conditions following the global market crash in 2000 and the devastating local economic crisis
in February 2001. 54 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
aftermarket consists of the following 36 months, where months are defined as succes-
sive 21-trading day periods. We computed only holding-period returns since Conrad and
Kaul (1993) show that long-term cumulative adjusted returns are potentially biased. 
We have not examined beyond three years like Loughran (1993), who shows that
IPO underperformance extends beyond three years, since our sample period is limited
to only 11 years. Market return, which is computed by the daily change in the ISE-100
index as a representative of market portfolio, is used as a benchmark to measure the
abnormal return of IPOs.
The percentage abnormal buy-and-hold return for an IPO stock i (ARi) is calculated
as formula (1);
ARi = Ri – Rm (1)
Ri = Return on stock i computed for various holding periods from one day up to
three years (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 trading days, 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36 months following the IPO)4
Rm = Return on market portfolio (value-weighted ISE-100 index) over the same peri-
od of stock i.
We used both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric tests (sign and Wilcoxon
signed rank) to test the statistical significance of findings since the returns in our sam-
ple have non-normal distribution characteristics. Abnormal returns used in this study are
not explicitly adjusted for systematic risk. Instead, we used market beta to adjust the
returns of IPO stocks for systematic risk. The assumption that the beta is equal to 1.00
is unlikely to affect the essence of our results. 
Based on the evidence in previous studies, the sample is also divided into several cat-
egories to determine the nature of the observed average long-run underperformance.
First, the performance of IPOs is examined by each calendar year to determine if the
underperformance is skewed in certain years of study. Then,  the sample is classified
according to various firm characteristics, such as firm size, earnings-to-price ratio, book-
to-market ratio, foreign institutional ownership represented by the fraction of shares
that are sold to foreign institutional investors at the IPO, underwriters’ reputation, mar-
ket conditions (cold vs. hot market), number of investors, issue size in US Dollars, source
of shares that are sold at the IPO, i.e., from capital increase (rights issue) or sale of large
shareholders. Industry classification is not used since the number of firms in the sample
is limited and may lead to biased results.
4. Empirical Findings
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the abnormal (buy-and-hold) returns of
an equally weighted portfolio that consists of 234 IPO stocks traded during the pe-
riod 1990-2003. Initial abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant (at
(4) The returns are not adjusted by the inflation.55
The Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings 
in the ‹stanbul Stock Exchange
the 0.01 level). In other words, on average, the IPO stocks generate 5.94% more
return on their first trading day than the other stocks in the market. This short-term
outperformance (initial underpricing) following the offering is consistent with the
short-term positive abnormal IPO returns found in several studies. Our results provi-
de some evidence of reversal in prices of stocks starting from one month following
the IPO, as the median return declines significantly, even to negative (-1.19%) at the
end of the first month. This means that half of the IPO stocks provide lower returns
than the market portfolio even by the end of the first month after the IPO. After
the first 24 months, the average abnormal return of IPO stocks is strongly negative
(-13.03%), and reached to –84.50% at the end of the 36-month holding period, a
finding which is similar to but significantly higher than that of Ritter (1991) (Figure
1 and 2). Thus, IPOs in the ISE underperform the market significantly even in shor-
ter holding periods (i.e., one month) than the case in other stock markets, in parti-
cular, when the median returns are considered. The magnitude of this underperfor-
mance carries much economical weight. 
T Ta ab bl le e   1 1: : T Ta ab bl le e   1 1: :   S Su um mm ma ar ry y   S St ta at ti is st ti ic cs s   f fo or r   A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   ( (E Eq qu ua al l- -w we ei ig gh ht te ed d) )
*, **, and *** statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively at the t test, whereas a, b, and c statis-
tically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels at Wilcoxon signed-rank and sign tests, respectively.
F Fi ig gu ur re e   1 1: : T Th he e   M Ma ar rk ke et t   P Pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e   o of f   I IP PO Os s   i in n   t th he e   I IS SE E56 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
To examine the existence of the underperformance phenomenon of IPOs across years
and to investigate the relation between annual volume of issues, first day returns and
long-run performance, IPOs are categorized by their year of issuance. Table 1-A and 1-B
presents the distribution of IPOs across years. The number of IPOs fluctuates from year to
year. It seems that initial returns are persistently large across years, whereas the long-run
performance varies depending on the year of issuance. In most of the years, however,
the average, and in particular, median long-run abnormal returns of IPOs, are lower than
the market. For instance, in nine out of eleven years, median abnormal returns are less
than the market return for the one-year holding period. Similarly, the median abnormal
returns of IPOs indicate underperformance in eight out of eleven years for both two-year
and three-year holding periods. The pattern is similar for the average abnormal returns
across years, but the results are relatively mixed due to the non-normal skewed distribu-
tion of the average returns across years. There are notable occurrences of outperfor-
mance in some years for different investment horizons as well. For example, IPOs made
in 1993 and 1999 seem to outperform their benchmarks in the long run according to
both the average and the median returns. On average, more than 70% of the stocks
underperform the market following the first year after the issue. In sum, in spite of some
differences across years of issuance, the findings are in favor of our previous findings:
IPOs consistently underperform the market in long holding periods on the ISE.
F Fi ig gu ur re e   2 2: : T Th he e   A Av ve er ra ag ge e   V Va al lu ue e- -W We ei ig gh ht te ed d   A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   i in n   t th he e   I IS SE E
T Ta ab bl le e   1 1- -A A: : T Th he e   A Av ve er ra ag ge e   A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   A Ac cr ro os ss s   Y Ye ea ar rs s57
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To detect more evidence on the relation between the initial- and long-run per-
formance, the firms are categorized into five groups according to their first day
returns.5 The average 36-month holding period returns also provide some evidence
for a relation between the performance of initial and long-run IPOs. IPOs with the
highest initial abnormal returns generate the lowest long-term returns (-146.40%),
while IPOs with the lowest initial abnormal returns generate the largest (but still
negative, -2.21%) abnormal returns across groups. These findings support Ritter
(1991), who argues that long-run underperformance is positively related with initial
abnormal returns; however, the evidence is neither consistent nor strong. 
We also computed the value-weighted abnormal returns. The results in Table 2
show that post-issue performance of IPOs is significantly affected by the size of the
firms. Value-weighted abnormal returns display additional evidence for the existence
of underperformance in both small and large firms. However, smaller firms are asso-
ciated with more severe underperformance. Value-weighted (issue) average abnor-
mal returns of IPOs are significantly lower than those of equal-weighted IPOs both
for short- and long- holding periods. Although the underperformance of IPOs is
mostly due to small firms and can at least partially be explained by the firm size.
Then, in order to determine the nature of the observed average long-run under-
performance, our sample is classified into three groups of stocks that contain equ-
al numbers of IPOs.  Specific criteria analyzed include:  firm and issue size, number
T Ta ab bl le e   1 1- -B B: : T Th he e   M Me ed di ia an n   A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   A Ac cr ro os ss s   Y Ye ea ar rs s
T Ta ab bl le e   2 2: : S Su um mm ma ar ry y   S St ta at ti is st ti ic cs s   f fo or r   A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   ( (V Va al lu ue e- -w we ei ig gh ht te ed d) )
(5) Not presented here due to space constraints.58 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
of investors at the IPO, foreign institutional ownership, source of shares in the IPO,
market conditions (hot vs. cold market), underwriters’ reputation, firms’ risk and va-
luation (E/P, B/M ratios).
I IP PO O   S Si iz ze e: : One key size benchmark (Table 3), the proceeds in USD generated from
the IPOs, indicates that the smaller the IPO, the greater the abnormal return of
stocks up to six months following the IPO. Interestingly, the picture is reversed after
six months, when the small firms start to lose their appeal to investors because of
their significantly lower returns than larger firms. Although  underperformance
seems to be stronger for the smaller firms in the long run, it is not only due to small
firms since the average abnormal returns of the largest firms is also significantly neg-
ative over the 24-month and 36-month holding periods. In sum, our findings here
parallel those related to firm size. A positive relationship between issue size and
long-run performance is also consistent with Levis (1993) and other studies of the
US markets. Usually, issue size and company size are strongly correlated and so the
larger negative returns of small size issues might be generated by their financially
distressed position. Many small firms want to go public to raise a capital to finance
their new investment projects and reduce their high level of debt. If the outcome of
these projects ends up with failure, this situation puts them in a more distressed
position, which eventually is reflected in share prices. 
N Nu um mb be er r   o of f   I In nv ve es st to or rs s   a at t   I IP PO O: : We also use the number of investors, who bought
shares from the IPOs, as a representative of both size of the IPO and the distribu-
tion of allocated shares in the IPO.  A larger number of investors might represent
not only the size of the IPO but, more importantly, the interest attracted by the IPO.
T Ta ab bl le e   3 3: : A Ab bn no or rm ma al l   R Re et tu ur rn ns s   o of f   I IP PO Os s   B Ba as se ed d   o on n   I Is ss su ue e   S Si iz ze e   ( (U US SD D   P Pr ro oc ce ee ed ds s) )59
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The more investors participate in the IPO, the larger initial returns might be expect-
ed as a result of excess demand in the IPO shares and eventually the larger the
underperformance may be in the long run. This variable might also evidence the
level of dispersion among investors by providing insight into investors’ general view
of the company’s valuation. That is, a larger number of investors might show high-
er level of overvaluation attributed to the issue by the market as a whole. Thus, IPOs
with more investors may well result in larger initial abnormal returns because of
market psychology, especially under hot market conditions, which reverse to under-
performance in the long-run after investors realize they were too optimistic about
the value of the IPO (overvaluation) during the initial IPO offering. Consistent with
this, Pham  et al. (2003) argue that underpricing could be used to increase the num-
ber of new investors in IPOs and to decrease the inequality of shareholder distribu-
tion so as to encourage greater ownership dispersion towards higher after-market
liquidity. They show that the higher the underpricing, the more investors participate
to the IPO, and the more evenly distributed shareholder structure becomes. This
variable is strongly and positively related with the level of oversubscription given the
regulation of  allocation of IPO shares  in Turkey. This can lead to a more equitable
distribution among bidders. So, the number of investors who bought shares in an
IPO, shows how heterogeneous their expectations on company value. In other
words, number of investors which is a signal for the over or under subscription and
also the degree of equal allocation of shares in IPO, shows to what degree the IPO
is undervalued or overvalued. A number of studies show that an issue’s success is
directly related to its attraction to small investors.6 Like Turkey, some countries also
mandate a significant degree of ownership spread.
The sample of stocks analyzed is divided into three groups defined by the num-
ber of investors in the IPO. Table 4 displays the summarized statistics of the abnor-
mal returns for each of these groups. Consistent with our expectations, the average
abnormal initial return of IPOs of the first group (9.19%), which consists of the
largest number of investors, is significantly higher than the last group with the small-
est number of investors (7.18%). The outperformance of IPOs with the largest num-
ber of investors lasted until the end of the first six- month period following the IPO,
then the trend reverses.  Twenty-four months after the IPO, the average return of
the first group dropped to negative (-55.79%), while the average return of the third
group of stocks  increased 12.96%, which is 68% higher than the former group. The
data show that the IPOs with fewer investors outperform the IPOs with a larger
number of investors in the long-run. However, the test results are weak. 
(6) See for example Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) 60 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
F Fo or re ei ig gn n   I In ns st ti it tu ut ti io on na al l   O Ow wn ne er rs sh hi ip p: : Earlier evidence by Fields (1995) shows that the
IPOs having larger institutional shareholdings significantly outperform those with
smaller institutional shareholdings. In addition, if  investor sentiment is an important
factor influencing the underperformance of IPOs, small IPOs may be more affected.
Individuals are more likely to hold the shares of small IPOs since many institutional
investors are restricted from holding less liquid small-cap  stocks. To our knowled-
ge, there is little direct evidence in the literature regarding the effects of foreign ins-
titutional investors who bought shares in IPOs on the IPO performance. Similar to
the share of foreign ownership, Pham et  al. (2003) used share of block holders
(who buy more than 5% of issue) to measure the level of ownership concentration
and inequality in distribution of shares in IPOs.  Following suit, we apply foreign ins-
titutional ownership in the same way  manner. Furthermore, since this variable car-
ries  special importance for Turkish IPOs because the share of domestic institutional
investors who invest in  stocks in the ISE is  quite low  because of the   record high
risk-free real interest rates on Turkish T-Bills and the high volatility in the stock mar-
ket as a result of political and macroeconomic instability in our sample period.
This variable can be analyzed from variety of perspectives. The larger share of fo-
reign investors in the IPO might indicate the level of profit opportunity in the short-
term since investors tend to move quickly via smart money among countries, in par-
ticular in emerging markets like Turkey, where IPOs carry higher risk relative to de-
veloped markets. So, in addition to risks different from those faced by local inves-
tors, foreign portfolio managers seek additional return to compensate for the risks
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incurred. Moreover, higher demand by foreign investors lends an aura of assurance
to domestic investors during the IPO bidding stage and encourages them to partici-
pate to the offering. Therefore, the higher the fraction of shares devoted to foreign
investors, the larger the return in the first trading days and, conversely, the larger
the potential for underperformance because of a less dispersed ownership base
over the long term. Nonetheless, concentrated ownership may confer more value
on the company since it increases incentives among large shareholders who wish to
avoid agency costs through more effective monitoring; however, this is less prono-
unced in Turkish IPOs, because Turkish companies that go public sell only 15% to
20% of their outstanding shares to avoid losing control. Therefore, monitoring by
effecting a more concentrated ownership structure is not a pertinent concern when
discussing Turkish IPOs. On the other hand, the higher fraction of shares bought by
foreign institutional investors would be seen as the more rational valuation of the
IPO since institutional investors are less subject to fads and rumors in valuation re-
lative to individual investors. 
To determine whether the foreign ownership affects the performance of IPOs,
we classified the fraction of stocks that are sold to foreign institutional investors in
the IPOs studied into three groups. Consistent with our expectations, Table 5 illus-
trates that initial returns of IPOs, consisting of a larger share of foreign institutional
ownership, are significantly higher than those of the IPOs that have no foreign ins-
titutional ownership. For example, the first group, which contains stocks with the
highest fraction of shares sold to foreign institutional investors, generated 8.46% of
return in the first trading day, while the fourth group that has no foreign owners-
hip provided only 5.31%. But the outperformance of the first group reversed follo-
wing the second trading day,  possibly indicating a profit sell-off by foreign inves-
tors. One month following the IPO, the average return of the first group declined
to negative, -7.99%, while the average return of the last group rose to 20.17%. Ho-
wever, all groups underperformed regardless of the number of shares bought by fo-
reign institutional investors during IPO in the long run, underperformance remains
significantly less severe for stocks that attract low or no interest by foreign institu-
tional investors. This result surprises from two perspectives. First, foreign investors
normally are expected to hold stocks they acquire for longer periods. Second, fore-
ign institutional investors presumably make more accurate valuation decisions rela-
tive to individuals.  Interestingly, our findings are inconsistent with both of these ex-
pectations.62 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
S So ou ur rc ce e   o of f   s sh ha ar re es s   i in n   I IP PO O: : Another factor that is used to classify the sample of IPOs
in this study is the source of shares that are sold at the IPO, whether from capital
increases (rights issue) or from sales generated by large shareholders. This variable
defines where the proceeds from the shares sold to investors at an IPO come from,
which might be important for investors since it may also indicate where the proce-
eds of the IPO may go – that is, whether into the pockets of large shareholders or
revert back to the company. The former increases the wealth of the large sharehol-
ders but provides no benefit to the company itself, while the latter provides cash
flow for the company that can be used to finance new positive-NPV projects that
can lead to further growth. Companies that go public through capital increases are
supposed to grow faster in the future than companies that go public through sales
to large shareholders. With this consideration in mind, investors prefer to invest in
IPOs whose shares are sold as a “rights issue” through increases in paid-in capital.
The source of shares sold through the IPO thus affect investors’ decisions as whet-
her to participate in the IPO; investors also consider the size of demand for the IPO
shares by evaluating expectations about the projected growth rate of the company.
Thus, more demand for the IPOs through a rights issue capital increase may be ex-
pected to lead to higher initial returns relative to IPOs made through the sale of sha-
res of large shareholders.
Within this framework, all IPOs split into two groups, those of rights issues or sa-
les to large shareholders. The total number of IPOs in Table 6 seems to be slightly
higher than the number of observations we reported earlier since some IPOs that
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employ both methods, are included in each of the groups. Consistent with our ex-
pectations, our findings show that the average abnormal initial return of IPOs ma-
de through a rights issue is significantly higher than IPOs made through the sale of
large shareholders (6.60% vs. 4.64%). The difference between the mean returns of
the two groups in favor of first group rises to 4.2% at the end of the third trading
day and it lasts for six months following the IPO, then reverses to negative. The ave-
rage abnormal return of capital-increase IPOs declined to –68.1%, while the avera-
ge abnormal return of the sale of large shareholders IPOs increased to 24.4% at the
end of the two-year holding period and kept rising until the end of the third year
following the IPO. Interestingly, underperformance never exists for the IPOs made
through the sale of large shareholders.
M Ma ar rk ke et t   c co on nd di it ti io on ns s: : Another criterion used to partition our sample focuses on
market conditions when the firm goes public. There is some evidence in the litera-
ture that points to the effect of market conditions whether hot or cold, on the post-
IPO performance of stocks. IPOs made under hot market conditions, which repre-
sents heavy interest by investors in the IPO, are expected to yield larger returns in
the first few trading days than IPOs made in a cold market. The prices of hot mar-
ket IPO’s reverse as a result of change in beliefs of investors who realize that too
much optimism may be attributed to the new issues (overvaluation) under the hot
market conditions after some time elapses following the IPO. This reversion in pri-
ces relative to the market generates underperformance of IPOs made in hot mar-
kets. On the other hand, cold market IPOs, which might have lower initial returns
due to weaker interest by investors than hot market-IPOs, tend to maintain their
outperformance even in the long term. IPOs in  a hot market might also relate to
exemplify the signalling hypothesis, which assumes that the firm’s stock issue deci-
sion signal management’s  belief that it is now permissible for the company shares
to become overvalued. 
Similar to the previous studies, we used the number of companies that go public
and the gross proceeds of IPOs across years as representative of hot and cold mar-
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kets. The years that involve the highest IPO proceeds and the highest number of IPOs
relative to the average number of annual IPOs are considered hot markets (1990,
1997, and 2000), whereas the years with the lowest number of IPOs are deemed
cold markets (1992, 1993 and 1999). Consistent with earlier evidence and expecta-
tions, our findings, displayed in Table 7, confirm the effect of market conditions on
the underperformance puzzle of IPOs in the ISE. We find that cold market IPOs al-
ways, even on their first days in the market, significantly outperform both the mar-
ket and hot market IPOs continue to do so until the end of the 36-month holding pe-
riod. There is a significant difference between the initial (first day) average abnormal
returns of cold market and hot market IPOs (7.13% vs. 4.46%), respectively. The lon-
ger the holding period, the larger the average abnormal return of cold market IPOs
than hot market IPOs. For instance, cold market IPOs resulted in approximately 69%
more return than  hot market IPOs in 12-month holding period, while the outperfor-
mance of cold market-IPOs reached as high as 248% at the end of the two-year hol-
ding period (-39.84% vs. +208.13%). In contrast to hot market IPOs, cold market
IPOs are never subject to an underperformance problem. Thus, the underperforman-
ce puzzle of IPOs disappears, when the firms go public under cold market conditions.
The statistical and economic significance of the results lead us to conclude that mar-
ket conditions, whether hot or cold, significantly impact the post-IPO performance of
stocks. Our results are also consistent with Ritter’s (1991) observation that long-run
IPO underperformance may be dominated by a few years in a sample, consistent
with “windows of opportunity” for the firm. The characteristics of what constitutes
“cold market” years require further examination in the future.
U Un nd de er rw wr ri it te er rs s’ ’   r re ep pu ut ta at ti io on n: : The reputation of underwriters is another factor we
used to categorize our IPO sample since previous studies (for example, see Carter  et
al. (1998)) show the positive relation between the underwriters’ reputation and the
long-term performance of IPOs. They document that IPOs managed by good invest-
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ment banks outperform compared to the performance of IPOs managed by invest-
ment banks that have a relatively poor reputation in the market. Consistent with prior
studies, they also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are asso-
ciated with less short-run underpricing. Also, a substantial number of studies exam-
ine the effects of an underwriter’s reputation on the initial IPO performance (for
example, Logue (1973), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Maksimovic and Unal (1993),
Michaely and Shaw (1994)). 
While Megginson and Weiss (1991) use the relative market share of underwriters,
Michaely and Shaw (1994) use the capital of investment banks as a proxy for their
reputation. On the other hand, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that investors
use the investment bank’s past performance, as measured by the quality of firms in
which they have previously sold equity, to assess their credibility. Given these consid-
erations, we ranked underwriters based on their market share and paid-in capital. We
also employed a survey on brokers in the trading floor to check the quantitative rank-
ing results used in previous studies. The underwriters’  ranks place them in one of
three categories, where one represents the most prestigious underwriter and three
the least prestigious underwriter. 
Table 8 summarizes our findings for the effects of reputation of underwriters on
the post-issue performance of stocks, which are consistent with the previous findings
in the literature. IPOs managed by more prestigous underwriters significantly outper-
form IPOs conducted by less prestigious underwriters both for short and long holding
periods. This outperformance increases sharply as the holding period continues. It
seems that an investment bank’s reputation strongly affects IPO aftermarket perform-
ance. However, it is not the sole reason behind the underperformance of Turkish IPOs. 
E Ea ar rn ni in ng gs s- -t to o- -P Pr ri ic ce e   ( (E E/ /P P) )   a an nd d   B Bo oo ok k- -t to o- -M Ma ar rk ke et t   ( (B B/ /M M) )   R Ra at ti io os s: : The last two factors that
we used to categorize IPOs are E/P and B/M ratios of the companies that went pub-
lic. Both of these ratios are widely used by investment banks during the valuation
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process of the IPOs. In addition, there is extensive evidence in the literature indicat-
ing the strong positive relationship between these ratios (as also risk factors) and
stock returns as a compensation of the relatively higher risk of these stocks.
Therefore, we computed the E/Ps and B/Ms through the public offering price of the
stock and the last disclosed earnings figure as of the day before the first trading day
of the IPO. Then we divided the sample into three groups by ranking the IPOs from
high to low levels of E/P and B/M, separately. High-E/P and High-B/M IPOs are con-
sidered as value or distressed firms, which might be expected to generate larger ini-
tial returns and less underperformance in the long run due to undervaluation at the
IPO. Contrarily, Pham et al. (2003) find that firms with lower B/Ms are less interest-
ed in underpricing their shares since they expect large shareholders’ monitoring in
the future. In that sense, there is no interest by Turkish firms in conducting effec-
tive monitoring, they offer only limited shares of the company making the IPO, and
this will not change the concentrated ownership after the IPO.
Indeed, our findings in Table 9 show that the average abnormal return of the
highest-E/P IPOs is significantly and consistently higher than the lowest-E/P IPOs
both in the short and the long run. For example, high-E/P IPOs provide 3.8% high-
er return (7.84% vs. 4.01%) in their first trading day, whereas this difference in
returns rises to 20.3% (-20.86% vs. –41.19%)  two years after the IPO. Long-run
underperformance of high E/P IPOs is seriously lessened, although not eliminated
completely. On the other hand, although the highest B/M IPOs seem to be the most
underpriced IPOs in parallel to our expectations, surprisingly, they provide the low-
est returns across groups in the long term (Table 10). The average abnormal returns
of the lowest B/M IPOs are always positive even up to the 36 month-holding peri-
od. This seems to be related with the size of the firms of which low-B/M firms, most-
ly large firms, and underperformance weakens as the size of the firms that went
public increases.
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To check the robustness of our findings and the affect of size on the factors used
in this study, all abnormal returns based on the various factors previously cited were
also re-computed on a value-weighted basis. Table 11 confirms that size of firm does
matter and significantly affects an IPO’s aftermarket performance.  Similarly, size
also significantly impacts other factors analyzed in this study. It seems that most
long-run underperformance is mostly due to small firms combining with some other
factors such as hot market conditions and source of shares sold in IPO. Value-
weighted abnormal returns confirm and strengthen our previous findings.
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We also examined the cross characteristics of IPOs by each factor to clarify which
ones dominate the sample of returns are examined. Additionally, we also examined
the macroeconomic fundamentals of cold-market years, in which IPOs are always ab-
le to beat the market. In these years, both interest rates were significantly higher, whe-
reas the growth rates were much lower than those of hot-market years. Issue size,
number of investors, and share of foreign investors are substantially lower in cold-
than hot-market IPOs and these IPOs are more likely to be in rights issue than in lar-
ge shareholder sales.7 The characteristics of outperformers in one-year and two-year
periods (Table 12) confirm that IPOs that outperform the market in the long run are
mostly mid-size issues, of which shares are sold to a large number of investors while
the share of foreign investors is lower than the average. Then, we developed additio-
nal factors to measure how evenly the shares are allocated in such an IPO. Consistent
with the factors used by Pham  et al. (2003), these factors include the number of in-
vestors divided by the size-adjusted share of retail investors and per dollar value share
of retail investors. In contrast to Pham et al. (2003), we find that firms for which sha-
res are allocated in a more equal and less concentrated fashion generate less under-
pricing and underperformance. Table 13 shows that there is a negative relationship
between the dispersion of shares among shareholders at IPO and the magnitude of
long-run underperformance and the initial underpricing. The more dispersed the allo-
cation of shares, the smaller the long-run underperformance and underpricing. Last,
we run cross-sectional regressions to clarify which factors are most influential on the
performance of IPOs. Table 14 confirms our previous findings that market condition
(cold/hot) is the only statistically significant (at .01 level) factor affecting long-run re-
turns. Size also seems to influence the returns even though it is not statistically signi-
ficant. The number of investors and the E/P are the only two variables effective (at .05
level) on first-day abnormal returns of IPOs.8
(7) Also, real interest rates are significantly higher (16.6% vs -0.8%), whereas growth rate of economy
is significantly lower in cold market years than hot market years (2.8% vs. 8%). Not cited more du-
e to space constraints but can be obtained from authors based on request.
(8) Findings from the single-variable regressions and step-wise regression analysis are completely consistent
with the results of multi-variable regressions, while the possible multicollinearity are also controlled.69
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5. Summary and Conclusion
One of the most striking empirical regularities is the initial underpricing (large
and positive abnormal returns in the first trading day) and underperformance (large
and negative abnormal returns) of IPOs in the long run. Although there is extensive
amount of research that evidences, on a small scale, the existence of short-term out-
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performance and long-term underperformance of IPOs, mostly on the US markets,
there is still no consistent and conclusive evidence pointing to the determinants of
this phenomenon, especially with regard to international data, despite its importan-
ce for policy-makers, portfolio managers, shareholders and corporate managers.
This study examines the long-standing IPO puzzle in a leading emerging market,
Istanbul Stock Exchange by using new factors affecting the performance of IPOs
such as source of shares in the IPO (new issue or sale of large shareholders), alloca-
tion of shares and dispersion of investors (ownership of foreign investors, number
of investors, and breadth), as well as  existing factors such as market conditions
(hot/cold), underwriters’ reputation, and firm characteristics (issue and firm size,
E/P, and B/M ratios).
Using a sample of 234 IPOs listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange covering the
1990-2000 time period, this study documents an average abnormal first day return
of 5.94%, which is substantially lower than those cited in previous studies. We also
find that IPOs underperform on a number of relevant benchmarks in the 36-month
holding period following their listing. On average, IPOs underperformed the market
by 84.5% in this holding period, which is significantly higher than the performance
IPOs in other markets. The magnitude of underperformance is larger for smaller
companies. This result runs counter to Kiymaz (1997, 2000), who finds positive ab-
normal returns for the long run in the Turkish market. However, we provide strong
evidence of the existence of an IPO ‘puzzle’ in ISE paralleling those of other markets
worldwide. Hence, we would prefer to remain cautious in interpreting the evidence
for long-run IPO performance on the ISE due to non-normal skewed distribution of
IPO returns in a highly volatile market in our relatively short sample period.
By analyzing specific factors, we find that market conditions, source of shares, si-
ze, and the underwriters’ reputation apparently affect the underperformance phe-
nomenon. In particular, there is no underperformance in the long run for an IPOs
made in a cold market or those sales are primarily executed by large shareholders.
There is also a positive relationship between underwriters’ reputation, firm size, is-
sue size and long-run performance of IPOs. Additionally, our research indicates a ne-
gative relationship between the B/M ratio of firms as well as the fraction of foreign
ownership in an IPO and the returns of new issues over the long term. In contrast,
IPOs with large numbers of investors and foreign ownership generate large and po-
sitive abnormal initial returns. Allocation of shares in an IPO also affects after-mar-
ket performance of shares. There is a negative relationship between the dispersion
of shares among shareholders at IPO and the magnitude of long-run underperfor-
mance and the initial underpricing. The more dispersed allocation of shares decrea-
ses the magnitude of long-run underperformance and the initial underpricing.71
The Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings 
in the ‹stanbul Stock Exchange
One of the most striking differences of the findings in this study versus those of
earlier studies is that underperformance starts much earlier than shown for other
markets; as noted, it has even become apparent at the end of first month following
the IPO. At least, half of the IPOs underperform the market in their first month of
trading. This difference seems to be due to myopic investing behavior of investors
in the ISE, who mostly seek short-term returns in a volatile environment by exploi-
ting the abnormal initial returns of IPOs.9 Another significant difference from other
studies is our finding of a substantially lower magnitude of underpricing, less than
6%. At this point, our interpretation of this finding  runs completely counter to tho-
se of  several other researchers (for example, see Stehle, Ehrhardt, and Przybo-
rowsky, 2000), who argue that the increase in competition among investment
banks for underwriting mandates lead underwriters underprice the IPOs deliberately
to capture the monopoly rents. In contrast, we think that heavy competition among
investment banks to mandate the IPOs in a market such as the ISE, where the num-
ber of IPOs is very limited, leads to overvaluation, and so causes underperformance
in the long run, while limiting the abnormality often found in initial returns. Large
shareholders of companies seek higher IPO prices to maximize the value of their sha-
res. Indeed, the underpricing in the ISE is substantially lower than other markets
shown in previous studies, whereas underperformance is significantly higher. Anec-
dotal and survey-based information we receive from investment banks strongly sup-
port our above hypothesis. It motivates us to focus on the valuation of IPOs to furt-
her elucidate the evidence for this argument in the future. Another fact related with
the IPO process is, in practice, the rumors spread by the IPO manager that there is
excess demand for the IPO shares to attract the attention of investors. Large and
positive first day returns seem to be related to this behavior of investment bankers,
causing a magnet effect, mostly the overreaction of investors, who attribute too
much optimism (overvaluation) to the new issue.
The question remaining to be answered is how to interpret the economically sig-
nificant long-run existence of the underperformance phenomenon of Turkish IPOs.
One interpretation might be that a large information asymmetry causes the inves-
tors especially in developing country markets to be irrationally optimistic about
windfalls initial public offerings may yield. This attitude leads investors to pay too
(9) Persistently high level of inflation in the sample period, which is around 65% on average annually,
and high volatility in the economy shortened the average holding period of financial instruments
including high-yield (approx. 20% in real-term USD based annual returns) T-Bills and bank deposits.
For example, as of the end of 2002, 40.1% of local currency based bank deposits  in only one
month or shorter maturity. The share of the deposit accounts whose maturity is three months or
less is 88%. Moreover, 63.9% of the USD-based deposit accounts have a maturity of three months
or less. Average maturity of T-Bills is around 4 months. (Daily Milliyet, November 26, 2003). A lar-
ge portion of the trading volume in the stock market has been generated by day traders.72 Recep Bildik, Mustafa K. Y›lmaz
much in the immediate aftermarket period for an IPO, and then discover their “mis-
take” in the following years as argued by Ritter (1991) who concludes that the of-
fering price of underperformed IPO stocks is not too low but, rather, too high. Alt-
hough our results are consistent with this fact, the evidence of this simple irrationa-
lity during IPOs does not seem to completely explain the phenomenon. Another in-
terpretation might be the ability of managers in timing the IPO by observing the wil-
lingness of the market to pay too much for their stocks. Large and significant nega-
tive returns for the IPOs made in hot markets support this argument. 
This interpretation assumes that the market does not interpret the equity issuing
correctly even after much evidence for the underperformance of IPOs in the long
run. Our results also provide evidence of the market’s inefficiency since the informa-
tion is not fully reflected in prices paid after IPO, which results in long-run price dec-
lines relative to the market. In contrast, prices of IPO stocks rise in the first days and
months following the IPO, before they start declining relative to the market for pe-
riods of up to three years. If this interpretation is correct, then the evidence of per-
sistent and economically significant market inefficiency has important implications
for financial economists and regulators. The third explanation for our results might
be the mismeasurement of the relative risk of the firms in our sample. It is reaso-
nable to assume that significant risk differences could persist for long periods of ti-
me. The market, firm size, book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratio may not be
enough to capture all risks confronting these firms. 
Finally, our strong evidence supports the existence of the significant short-term
underpricing and the long-term underperformance of up to a three-year holding pe-
riod in the ISE. Investors should be aware of the risk that temporary large and posi-
tive initial returns of the firms issuing stock to the public for the first time may pro-
ve to be hazardous to investors’ wealth in the long run. However, although our evi-
dence shows that most of the factors used in this study, in particular, market con-
ditions, source of shares, and size significantly influence the post-issue performance
of IPOs, the mystery of this phenomenon requires further investigation.73
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